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COMMENT

Using Learned Helplessness to Understand
the Effects of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
and Major Depressive Disorder on Refugees
and Explain Why These Disorders Should
Qualify as Extraordinary Circumstances
Excusing Untimely Asylum Applications
BRANDON R. WHITE†
INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are a refugee. For some personal reason
outside of your control, say your race or religion, you are
targeted by others and suffer some harm. This harm almost
certainly involves some level of violence. Perhaps you are
beaten, raped, or tortured. Maybe you watched your family
and friends suffer the same, maybe some of these family and
friends were murdered in front of your eyes. Obviously, going
to your government for help is pointless. Either your
government is directly involved or they are completely
unwilling or unable to protect you. Fleeing is your only real
option.
You are able to bring few of your possessions and you
probably spend most, if not all, of your money escaping. You
arrive in a new country, are confused by its culture and
language, and have a tenuous and uncertain legal status.
You desire a more permanent status, but your first priority
† J.D. Candidate, 2016, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.S. Biological Sciences:
Neurobiology & Behavior, 2007, Cornell University. I’d like to thank Professor
Anjana Malhotra for introducing me to this area of law and pointing me in the
right direction. Also, thank you to my Editor, William Rossi, and his publications
team for their fine work getting this Comment ready for publication.
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is finding a way of supporting yourself and your family. You
don’t know about asylum, and the thought of turning to your
new government for help never crossed your mind. Perhaps
even after becoming aware of asylum, because of your past
experiences, you do not trust any state officials.
At any rate, the trauma you suffered prevents you from
seeking help right away. When you think about the past, you
re-experience that fear and pain, and you desperately avoid
everything that reminds you of your old trauma. After time
and (if you are lucky) treatment, you finally feel ready to seek
asylum. However, you learn that you are too late. Your new
government has deemed any application for asylum
submitted more than a year after arrival in this new country
to be presumptively fraudulent and barred.
Unfortunately, this is an accurate description of the
experience of many refugees seeking asylum in the United
States. Asylum law in the United States imposes a one-year
bar for all asylum applications. While this bar may be waived
for certain changed or extraordinary circumstances—which
include mental illnesses—the actual application of these
exceptions is prohibitively narrow. As a result, many
refugees who suffer from severe mental disorders that
prevent them from applying for asylum are precluded from
obtaining appropriate relief.
This problem is not the result of spite or caprice on the
part of adjudicating officials. Rather, the problem arises out
of a misunderstanding of the nature of these disorders.
Looking into other areas of law that have struggled to
account for and explain mental processes may offer some help
to these refugees. Specifically, the theory of learned
helplessness, a central aspect of the Battered Woman’s
Syndrome, could provide that help.
First, Part I provides a brief overview of United States
asylum law before moving on to a more detailed discussion of
the one-year bar. This Part proposes that the one-year bar
was a misguided effort at reform that has failed to further
Congress’s objectives and poses an unfair obstacle to bonafide refugees. Part II discusses posttraumatic stress disorder
(“PTSD”) and major depressive disorder (“MDD”)—the most
prevalent mental disorders in the refugee community—and
explains why these disorders are so common in that
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community, and how refugees are affected by them. Part III
outlines how immigration judges and asylum officers have
adjudicated claims raising PTSD and MDD as extraordinary
circumstances and explains why their analysis is often
flawed. Part IV briefly discusses Battered Woman Syndrome
by way of introducing the theory of learned helplessness, a
model of behavior closely tied to both PTSD and MDD and
one which the courts are familiar with. Finally, this
Comment concludes with Part V, which argues that learned
helplessness, as a straight forward and intuitive theory, is
well-suited for explaining the effects of PTSD and MDD on
refugees and (1) provides support for the abolition of the oneyear bar; and (2) supplies late-filing refugees a way to
demonstrate that their mental ailments are extraordinary
circumstances within the framework of the current law.
I. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW
AND THE ONE-YEAR BAR
A. International Asylum Law
Responding to a massive increase in refugees fleeing
Europe following World War II,1 the United Nations (“UN”)
adopted the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees (“the Convention”).2 The Convention formalized the
rights belonging to refugees and the legal obligations of
participating states.3 These include a guarantee of nonrejection at borders and fair procedures for determining an
applicant’s refugee status.4 The principal legal obligation
imposed on participating states, however, is the duty of
1. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (Sept. 2011),
http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html [hereinafter UNHCR, CONVENTION &
PROTOCOL].
2. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention].
3. See PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951, at 32-36 (Paul Weis ed.,
1995) [hereinafter PAUL WEIS, CONVENTION].
4. Scott Kuhagen, The Third—and Likely Fourth—Death of the Refugee
Protection Act: Sensible Changes to Asylum Still Required, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R.
L. REV. 567, 571 (2012).
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nonrefoulement, which prohibits participating states from
returning a refugee to a country where he or she will face
persecution.5
To help standardize asylum law in signatory nations, the
Convention also promulgated a universal definition of
“refugee.”6 Under the Convention’s definition, a refugee is an
individual who, “owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion,
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or,
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the
protection of that country.”7
The provisions of the Convention were limited in reach
and only required to apply to situations arising in Europe
before January 1, 1951.8 Newly arising humanitarian crises
compelled the UN and participating states to expand the
reach of the Convention’s protections.9 This was
accomplished through the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”), which incorporated the
Convention in its entirety and removed the date and
originating country limitations.10
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol.11
While the United States is not a direct signatory of the
5. Lowenstein Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Aliens and the Duty of
Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 14
(1993).
6. UNHCR, CONVENTION & PROTOCOL, supra note 1, at 3.
7. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 152.
8. Id. at 152-53.
9. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951

CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 6
(2011), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK];
M.R. ALBORZI, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW:
THE PROTECTION OF IRAQI REFUGEES 138-39 (2006).
10. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, ¶ 2, Jan. 31, 1967,
606 U.N.T.S. 267.
11. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Nancy Kelly, GenderRelated Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 625, 634 (1993).
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Convention, because the 1967 Protocol incorporated the
Convention, in acceding to the 1967 Protocol the United
States became a party to the Convention as well.12
B. Asylum Law in the United States
Though the United States has a long history of offering
protection and safe harbor to refugees, refugee status was
determined on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis until 1980.13 It
was only when the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed that the
United States formally codified its asylum law.14 Congress
recognized that the Convention and 1967 Protocol carried
legal—as well as moral—authority, and the Refugee Act was
intended to “bring United States refugee law into
conformance with [its treaty obligations under] the 1967
United Nations Protocol.”15 Accordingly, the Refugee Act
incorporated the Convention’s definition of refugee nearly
verbatim.16 Under the Refugee Act, a refugee is
any person who is outside any country of such person’s
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in
a particular social group, or political opinion.17

To be granted asylum in the United States, an individual
must demonstrate that they are a refugee according to this
definition.18 To do so, an applicant must show that they (1)
have a well-founded fear of future persecution; (2) based on
the statutorily protected grounds of race, religion,
12. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 6; JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS
110-11 (2005).

OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW

13. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12 (1981).
14. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102.
15. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987).
16. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law:
Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1068-69
(2011).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) (2012).
18. § 1158(b)(1)(A).
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nationality, membership in a social group, or political
opinion.19
A well-founded fear of future persecution consists of both
a subjective and objective element.20 The applicant must have
an actual, subjective fear of persecution, and this fear must
be objectively reasonable.21 A showing that the applicant
suffered persecution in the past gives rise to a presumption
that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future
persecution.22
There is no statutory or regulatory definition of
persecution.23 However, while “courts have not ‘settled on a
single, uniform definition,’” there is general agreement on
what persecution entails24—persecution consists of a high
degree of harm accompanied by some level of involvement by
the government.25
As for the harm aspect, persecution is “the infliction of
suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race,
religion[, nationality, social group,] or political opinion) in a
way regarded as offensive.”26 Put differently, persecution is
“the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s
person or freedom.”27 The level of harm required to find
19. §1101(a)(42).
20. Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006).
21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1987). An objecively
reasonable fear has been construed to mean only a 10% or higher chance of
persecution if returned. Id. at 439-40.
22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2015); see also, e.g., Imelda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 611
F.3d 724, 728 (11th Cir. 2010).
23. Gonzalez v. INS, 77 F.3d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996).
24. Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ivanishvili
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 340 (2d Cir. 2006)).
25. See, e.g., Garcia-Colindres v. Holder, 700 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012)
(“The BIA has adopted, and we have approved as reasonable, a definition of
persecution that requires a harm to be inflicted either by the government of [a
country] or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or
unwilling to control.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416
F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005).
26. In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336 (B.I.A. 2000).
27. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting RegaladoGarcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002)).
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persecution
is
“more
than
mere
discomfiture,
unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment.”28 Harm
qualifying as persecution is often extreme and severe.
Disturbingly common examples of persecution include
various forms of torture,29 mutilation,30 rape,31 and other
types of interpersonal violence.32 However, the effect of the
harm must be considered in the cumulative, and the sum of
relatively minor harms can rise to the level of persecution.33
28. Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Lopez-Castro v.
Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009)).
29. See, e.g., Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The
government sent Ilunga to prison where he spent more than a month in a small
cell . . . . Ilunga suffered daily torture. Prison guards stabbed him and poured
battery acid in the wounds. They shocked him with an electrical club, routinely
whipped him, and raped him. . . . Ilunga . . . escaped from prison . . . [and] fled to
Zambia . . . . While Ilunga remained in Zambia, the government tortured his
family, raped his wife, and burned his home.”); Kann Vegas v. U.S. Att’y. Gen.,
356 F. App’x 326, 329 (11th Cir. 2009) (“When Kann Vegas awoke he was in a
room, handcuffed, blindfolded, and hanging without a shirt. His captors beat him,
electrocuted him, and doused him with water for twelve hours . . . .”).
30. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2005)
(“When Ms. Niang was nearly 25, her family had a meeting in which they decided
that she must consummate her marriage with Daud that evening. She again
refused, and her family threw themselves on her, stripping her of her clothes,
beating her, and burning her with a hot iron. Some then performed FGM on her
‘[s]o that [she] wouldn’t be able to commit adultery and so that no one would want
to have anything to do with [her]. And then she would be ashamed to show [her]
body in front of another man.’” (alteration in original)).
31. See, e.g., Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004)
(“One of the soldiers came back inside of the house, told my mother that she had
to cook food for them, and took her by force to the kitchen and made her cook food
for them. While my mother was in the kitchen cooking food and my father was
tied up, I was left alone with one of the soldiers. The soldier hit me with his gun
and fists and then held my arms down while he raped me. When he was finished,
the other two soldiers took turns raping and beating me.”).
32. See, e.g., Vincent v. Holder, 632 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he
totality of the circumstances—which includes the killing of Vincent’s son and the
house burning—satisfy a finding of past persecution.”); Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d
607, 610 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Voci indicated that . . . he was beaten up on many
occasions by the police. Voci testified that seven of these beatings were severe,
resulting in bleeding and scars. . . . On one occasion, the police beat Voci with the
blunt end of a gun, breaking his knee and causing Voci to spend several weeks in
the hospital.”).
33. Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 805 (10th Cir. 2013) (“‘We do not look at
each incident in isolation, but instead consider them collectively, because the
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Aside from the harm requirement, persecution also
“implies some connection to government action or inaction.”34
This connection often exists through direct government
involvement, where the persecutors are agents of the
government acting at its direction.35 The government
connection may also arise through acquiescence, where
government officials are aware of the persecution but
implicitly authorize it or refuse to take action to prevent it. 36
Finally, the connection may exist where, despite its best
efforts, the government is simply unable to stop the
persecutors.37
Individuals present in the United States may apply for
asylum two different ways.38 First, they may seek asylum

cumulative effects of multiple incidents may constitute persecution.’” (quoting
Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011)).
34. Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Lopez-Castro v.
Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009)).
35. See, e.g., Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011).
36. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013) (“‘[A]wareness and
willful blindness’ are sufficient to constitute acquiescence by government officials;
actual knowledge or willful acceptance is not required.” (quoting Zheng v.
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2013)).
37. See, e.g., Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2008).
38. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW 9
(Mar.
4,
2011),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Resources%20for%20Congress/ Congressional%20 Reports/2011%20National%20
Immigration%20%26%20Consular%20Conference%20Presentations/Asylum%20
Division%20Overview.pdf [hereinafter ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW]. Applying for
asylum after arriving in the United States is not the only way for refugees to
obtain asylum. Refugees who have fled persecution to other countries may be
granted asylum in the United States through the Refugee Admissions Program.
U.S. DEP’T STATE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (May 23, 2014),
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2014/228681.htm.
These
individuals first register as refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (“UNHCR”). Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE
ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS v-vi (Oct. 1, 2015),
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/247982.pdf. The Department of
State and the Department of Homeland Security interviews the refugee and
conducts a medical and security screening. U.S. DEP’T STATE ET AL., supra. If the
outcome of the interview and screenings are satisfactory, the refugee will be
granted asylum in the United States. Id.
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proactively through an affirmative asylum application.39
Alternatively, individuals may defensively file for asylum in
an Immigration Court.40 Affirmative asylum applications
begin with the submission of an asylum application form to
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service
(“USCIS”).41 The applicant then conducts a non-adversarial
interview with an asylum officer at one of eight asylum
offices.42 If the asylum officer finds the applicant credible and
the applicant satisfies the requirements for asylum, the
officer will grant the applicant asylum.43 If the asylum officer
believes the applicant is not credible or does not meet the
requirements for asylum, the officer will deny the application
and—if the applicant does not have lawful status or requests
review of the decision—forward the application to an
immigration judge for a de novo determination.44
Defensive asylum applications are filed reactively by
individuals already in removal proceedings.45 These
defensive applications, as well as appeals or referrals from
an asylum office, are heard in an administrative court run by
the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration

39. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES
MANUAL 2 (Nov. 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/native
documents/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf [hereinafter AFFIRMATIVE
ASYLUM MANUAL].
40. ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 9.
41. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 39, at 4-5. For affirmative
asylum applications, the applicant is first run through a security screening that
includes running the applicants biometrics and conducting a background check.
Id. at 5-7. If the background check returns satisfactory results, the applicant will
conduct a non-adversarial interview with an asylum officer at one of eight asylum
offices. See id. at 8-12, 29.
42. ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 4, 9-10.
43. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 39, at 23-24.
44. See Shoukat v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2005);
Martins v. USCIS, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2013); 8 C.F.R.
§§ 208.30(g), 1208.30(g); see also Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The
Detrimental Effects of A Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers,
27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 61, 71, 75 (2009).
45. Settlage, supra note 44, at 75.
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Review (“EOIR”).46 Immigration Court proceedings are
adversarial in nature and held in front of an immigration
judge, opposed by counsel from DHS.47 Immigration Court
decisions may be appealed to the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA”).48 In turn, BIA decisions may be appealed to
the federal court of appeals for the jurisdiction in which the
Immigration Court originally adjudicated the application.49
C. The One-Year Bar
In the early 1990s, some members of Congress became
convinced that the asylum system was being abused by
individuals who were not bona-fide refugees.50 These
Congress members believed that individuals in removal
proceedings were applying for asylum defensively simply to
delay their removal51 and that many applicants who were not
actual refugees were applying for asylum solely to obtain
work permits.52 It was felt that such meritless and fraudulent
claims were imposing an excessive burden on the
adjudication system.53
In 1996, as a measure to combat this perceived fraud
problem, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform
46. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE
MANUAL 1.2(a)-(d), 3.1(b)(iii) (2016).
47. EOIR at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/press/2010/ EOIRataGlance09092010.htm.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. See 141 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Franks); Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary,
10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 102 (1996); see also 142 CONG. REC. S4468 (daily ed. May
1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson) (“We are not after the person from Iraq, or
the Kurd, or those people. We are after the people gimmicking the system.”).
51. Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies: The
Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L.
REV. 693, 695 (2008).
52. Misha Seay, Better Late than Never: A Critique of the United States’ Asylum
Filing Deadline from International and Comparative Law Perspectives,
34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 423 (2011).
53. Pistone, supra note 50, at 101-02.
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and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).54 Responding
to the concerns discussed above, the IIRIRA established,
among other things, a timeline during which asylum
applications would be accepted.55 This provision provides that
an applicant for asylum must demonstrate, by “clear and
convincing evidence,” that their asylum application was filed
within one year of their entry in the United States.56 In
essence, the IIRIRA enacted a statute of limitations for
asylum that begins to run on an alien’s arrival in the United
States.57
The original bill proposed a 30-day bar and included no
exceptions.58 Despite concerns about fraud, many members of
Congress wanted to ensure that legitimate asylum claims
were not precluded by any time-bar.59 Mental disability was
a special concern and was explicitly mentioned in the Senate
debates as a circumstance that should give rise to an
exception for untimely asylum applications.60 As Senator
54. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546.
55. Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 67071 (2010).
56. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012).
57. Id.
58. Schrag et al., supra note 55, at 672.
59. 142 CONG. REC. S11839-40 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Hatch) (indicating desire to “ensure that asylum is available to those with
legitimate claims of asylum” and commitment to “ensuring that those with
legitimate claims of asylum are not returned to persecution, particularly for
technical deficiencies”); id. at S11840 (statement of Sen. Abraham) (“If the time
limit and the exceptions you have discussed do not provide sufficient protection
to aliens with bona fide claims of asylum, I will be prepared to work with my
colleagues to address that problem.”); id. at S11904 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“If
the use of asylum claims defensively to ward off deportation is the problem, let us
deal with that problem and not penalize refugees with valid asylum claims who
were too traumatized or fearful to come forward until they had gotten settled in
this new land.”); Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 695.
60. 142 CONG. REC. S11491 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch)
(“Extraordinary circumstances excusing the delay could include, for instance,
physical or mental disability . . . .”); 142 CONG. REC. S3299 (daily ed. Apr. 15,
1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (“Among those excluded [by a time bar] would
be . . . the very people who need more time to apply, the very people who deadlines
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Edward Kennedy explained in a speech supporting an
amendment to extend the original 30-day application
deadline:
The bottom line is that the cases where there appears to be the
greatest validity of the persecution claims—the ones involving
individuals whose lives would be endangered by a forced return to
their particular countries—are often the most reluctant to come
forward. They are individuals who have been, in the most
instances, severely persecuted. They have been brutalized by their
own governments. They have an inherent reluctance to come
forward and to review their own stories before authority figures.
Many of them are so traumatized by the kinds of persecution and
torture they have undergone, they are psychologically unprepared
to be able to do it. It takes a great deal of time for them to develop
any kind of confidence in any kind of legal or judicial system, after
what they have been through, and to muster the courage to come
forward.61

Ultimately, concern for protecting legitimate refugees
motivated Congress to increase the timeline to one year and
provide for exceptions that would waive untimely
applications in certain situations.62 The exceptions were
“intended to provide adequate protections to those with
legitimate claims of asylum.”63 In order to avoid denying
bona-fide refugees asylum, the exceptions to the one-year bar
were designed to cover a broad range of circumstances in
order to prevent denying asylum claims “for technical
difficulties.”64
Two separate exceptions to the one-year bar were
recognized by the statute.65 First, an exception was granted
for “changed circumstances” that “materially affect the
would hurt the most. These are the people who have suffered a great trauma that
prevents them from coming forward. . . . Time can cure the personal trauma and
culture shock that prevents them from seeking asylum. Time can allow conditions
to change back home. A time limit—any time limit—will place these people at
risk.”).
61. 142 CONG. REC. S3282 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996).
62. Schrag et al., supra note 55, at 672.
63. 142 CONG. REC. S11840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
64. Id.
65. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012).
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applicant’s eligibility for asylum.”66 This includes changes in
United States law applicable to asylum, changes in the
applicant’s circumstances, and/or changes in the conditions
of the applicant’s home country.67 Second, an exception was
made for “extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay
in filing an application.”68 An applicant seeking an exception
under either ground must “demonstrate[ ] to the satisfaction
of the Attorney General”69 that either changed or
extraordinary circumstances excused their failure to timely
file.70
Several years after the IIRIRA was enacted into law, the
INS promulgated implementing regulations for the one-year
bar.71 The regulations provide a nonexhaustive list of

66. Id.
67. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A)-(C) (2015).
68. 8 U.S.C.
1208.4(a)(4)-(5).

§

1158(a)(2)(D);

see

also

8

C.F.R.

§§

208.4(a)(4)-(5),

69. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). In other contexts, the BIA has explained that “to
the satisfaction of the Attorney General” requires a showing of “credible evidence
sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the Attorney General in the exercise of his
reasonable judgment, considering the proof fairly and impartially.” In re Bufalino,
12 I. & N. Dec. 277, 282 (B.I.A. 1967). This standard has been interpreted as
equivalent to the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE: ONE-YEAR FILING
DEADLINE 21 (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/
Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-YearFiling-Deadline-31aug10.pdf [hereinafter FILING DEADLINE TRAINING COURSE].
70. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The statute enacting the one year bar originally
precluded federal review of decisions regarding exceptions to the one year bar.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (“No Court shall have jurisdiction to review any
determination of the Attorney General [as to exceptions to the one-year bar].”). In
2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act which modified the law to permit Courts
of Appeals to review BIA decisions that raised constitutional questions or
questions of law. Pub. L. No. 109–13, Div. B, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 310
(May 11, 2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)) (explaining that “[n]othing
in . . . any . . . provision of this Act . . . shall be construed as precluding review of
constitutional claims or questions of law”). There is currently a circuit split as to
whether, and the extent to which, a BIA determination regarding the applicability
of exceptions to the one-year bar is reviewable. Compare Ramadan v. Gonzales,
479 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewable), with Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d
762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007) (not reviewable).
71. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)-(5); Seay, supra note 52, at 425.
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circumstances which may excuse an untimely filing.72 Among
these circumstances are “[s]erious illness or mental or
physical disability, including any effects of persecution or
violent harm suffered in the past, during the 1-year period
after arrival.”73
The existence of one of the enumerated examples is, by
itself, insufficient to excuse an untimely asylum application.74
Rather, the determination of whether an exception exists
requires “an individualized analysis of the facts of the
particular case.”75 The regulations for the one year bar
provide that, even if an exception to the bar applies, the
applicant bears the burden of proving that the subsequent
delay was “reasonable under the circumstances.”76 The
regulations further provide that the circumstance must not
have been created intentionally by the applicant and must be
directly related to failure to file.77
Failure to demonstrate an exception to the one year bar
does not necessarily prevent a refugee from obtaining any
relief from removal.78 Withholding under the INA may still
be available to refugees and is not subject to the one year
bar.79 Withholding, like asylum, requires that an applicant
72. § 208.4(a)(4)-(5).
73. § 208.4(5)(i). Other extraordinary circumstances include legal disability,
ineffective assistance of counsel, possessing another form of legal status, the
rejection of an application submitted within the one-year period for technical
defects, and/or death or serious illness of an immediate family member of the
applicant. § 208.4(5)(ii)-(vi).
74. In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 287-88 (B.I.A. 2002).
75. Id. at 288 (“[T]he respondent must establish the existence or occurrence of
the extraordinary circumstances, must show that those circumstances directly
relate to his failure to file the application within the 1-year period, and must
demonstrate that the delay in filing was reasonable under the circumstances.”).
76. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(4)-(5), 1208.4(a)(4)-(5).
77. §§ 208.4(a)(5), 1208.4(a)(5).
78. See, e.g., Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 2007).
79. See, e.g., id. Applicants denied asylum may also obtain relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), which is not subject to time bar. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 208.16(c). To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must “establish that it is more
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country
of removal.” § 208.16(c)(2). Though CAT “does not require that the prospective
risk of torture be on account of certain protected grounds,” Kamalthas v. INS,
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demonstrate that they are a refugee according to the
statutory definition.80 However, withholding relief is subject
to a higher standard of proof.81 Rather than simply
demonstrating a reasonable fear of persecution, to be granted
withholding, an applicant must show that they will probably
suffer persecution if returned to their original country of
residence (i.e., 10% vs. 51%).82
Moreover, withholding does not grant a refugee the same
rights and privileges available to those granted asylum.
Refugees granted asylum can obtain derivative asylum
status for their spouse and children, even if they are
otherwise ineligible for asylum themselves.83 Derivative
status applies not only to family members currently present
in the United States, but also to family members present in
other countries—enabling separated families to legally
reunite.84 Derivative status is unavailable to refugees who
are granted withholding relief.85 Refugees granted asylum
251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001), it still requires a nexus to government action
or inaction. In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002). Moreover, the harm
required for actions to qualify as torture is much higher than that of persecution.
See, e.g., id. CAT offers no path to citizenship, Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at
721, and the relief offered by CAT is temporary and may be revoked by the
government. See Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Deferral
of removal is a more temporary form of protection. It can be terminated more
quickly and easily if an alien no longer is likely to be tortured in the country of
removal, or if the U.S. government receives assurances that the alien will not be
tortured if returned.”).
80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012).
81. See, e.g., Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“Withholding of removal is also based on persecution but implicates a more
demanding standard of proof.”) (quoting Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 446 n.3
(4th Cir, 2011).
82. See, e.g., Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003)
(explaining that, to obtain withholding, “[a]n alien bears the burden of
demonstrating that he more-likely-than-not would be persecuted or tortured upon
his return to the country in question”).
83. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3).
84. Melanie A. Conroy, Refugees Themselves: The Asylum Case for Parents of
Children at Risk of Female Genital Mutilation, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 111-12
(2009).
85. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (providing for derivative status), with
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (not providing for derivative status).
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also have a path to citizenship: Asylees are eligible to apply
for permanent status within one year of being granted
asylum and can then pursue citizenship like any other legal
permanent resident.86 Withholding, on the other hand,
provides no path to legal residence or citizenship.87
D. Criticisms and Problems with the One-Year Bar
The one year bar was an unnecessary measure based on
a largely imagined problem.88 As the Commissioner of the
INS explained, a filing deadline was “an idea born of
assumptions about a system in the past that wasn’t working
effectively.”89 By the time the provision came into law, the
Justice Department had already developed and implemented
a number of significant measures to prevent fraudulent
asylum claims.90 Among these measures, a unit dedicated
exclusively to adjudicating asylum claims was created within
the INS.91 This unit utilized new procedures to quickly
identify and grant meritorious claims while referring suspect

86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b).
87. See Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 523 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The grant
of asylum is a broader form of relief that sets one on a path to citizenship. One
year after being granted asylum, an asylee may apply for adjustment of status to
lawful permanent resident. In contrast, the grant of withholding of removal
merely prevents one from being removed to the country where one’s life or
freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground.”) (citations
omitted).
88. The one year bar (or at least the way the bar is applied, which is discussed
more fully below) may also be in violation of the 1951 Convention, see, e.g.,
UNHCR EXEC. COMM., CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 18, 19 (2009) (“While asylumseekers may be required to submit their asylum request within a certain time
limit, failure to do so, or the non-fulfilment of other formal requirements, should
not lead to an asylum request being excluded from consideration.”), which the
United States is obligated to comply with. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416
(1984).
89. Pistone, supra note 50, at 102.
90. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING PROTECTION
TO THE PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY 3, 25-26 (Sept.

2010) [hereinafter HRW, FILING DEADLINE].
91. Pistone, supra note 50, at 102.
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claims to Immigration Court for removal proceedings.92 The
Department of Justice also removed much of the incentive for
filing fraudulent asylum claims by reforming the procedures
for obtaining employment authorization.93
These measures were quite successful. In the three years
preceding the enactment of the one year bar provisions, the
yearly rate of completed asylum claims increased more than
two fold.94 The rate of asylum claims submitted also fell,
suggesting that many fraudulent or unmeritorious asylum
applications had been discouraged.95
However, even ceding the validity of Congress’s concern
about fraudulent asylum applications, the bar has also
produced the opposite result of its intended effect. A primary
animating concern behind the bar was that the adjudicating
agencies were being overwhelmed by frivolous asylum
claims.96 Congress believed the one-year bar would help
relieve this burden.97 Instead, the one-year bar has increased
the strain on asylum offices and Immigration Courts.98
For every asylum claim, the adjudicating official must
now be satisfied, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that the
application was filed within one year of the applicant arriving
in the United States.99 Even when an application is filed on
time, this adds to the time, effort, and expense required to
adjudicate claims.100 However, a significant proportion of
legitimate asylum seekers do not apply within one year of
92. Id.
93. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 696.
94. Pistone, supra note 50, at 102.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 101-02.
97. Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved
but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 9 (2001) (“[M]embers of the 104th
congress were intent on imposing a deadline, apparently under the belief that
such a bar was necessary to prevent time-consuming adjudication of fraudulent
applications.”).
98. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 14.
99. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(A) (2015).
100. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 15.
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arriving in the United States.101 With the majority of these
applicants seeking an exception to the bar (in addition to
other forms of relief), this has created two proceedings within
one, greatly increasing the cost of adjudication and time
required to process asylum applications.102
Moreover, the one year bar has done a poor job
separating legitimate asylum claims from fraudulent ones.103
Instead, the one year bar is working to prevent legitimate
refugees from obtaining appropriate relief.104 The available
documentation is rife with examples of individuals being
denied asylum on the basis of the one year bar who then go
on to satisfy the higher standard of withholding or CAT.105
The one-year bar does not prevent fraud. It serves only to
punish legitimate refugees.
Looking at the circumstances faced by newly arrived
refugees demonstrates why the one-year bar is an
inappropriate measure to screen legitimate asylum
applications from fraudulent ones. Applying for asylum is a
complex and demanding process.106 Refugees must fill out, in
101. See Pistone, supra note 50, at 96-97; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR.
THE ONE-YEAR ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: NO PROTECTION, NO
PROCESS 5 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter NO PROTECTION] (“This study analyzed 3,472
BIA cases, of which 662 (19 percent) involved the filing deadline.”); Michele R.
Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum and Expedited
Removal—What The INS Should Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1565, 1566 (1996)
(“A study by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights showed that in the past,
only 38 percent of bona fide asylum applicants apply for asylum within one
year.”).
ET AL.,

102. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 15.
103. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 699-700; see also NO PROTECTION, supra
note 101, at 6 (“In approximately 46 percent of cases where the filing deadline is
an issue, it is the only reason cited by the BIA as justifying the denial of asylum.”).
104. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 15-18.
105. See, e.g., Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 2014); Gasparyan
v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2013); Vrljicak v. Holder, 700 F.3d 1060,
1061 (7th Cir. 2012); Vincent v. Holder, 632 F.3d 351, 352 (6th Cir. 2011);
Khunaverdiants v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 2008); Viracacha v.
Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2008); Mlambo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 297
F. App’x 198, 199 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 699703.
106. See, e.g., Seay, supra note 52, at 428.
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English, a complicated ten page form, and collect and compile
and translate documentation to corroborate his or her
story.107 Refugees fleeing persecution often leave their
countries of nationality with little, if any, documentation.108
Depending on the conditions back home, this documentation
may be extraordinary difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.109
Compounding these problems, many refugees are unable
to afford legal representation to guide them through this
process.110 As a result, they must learn about the substantive
law and navigate the procedural aspects of the law by
themselves.111 At the same time, often with minimal support
and no work authorization, refugees must still find a way to
support themselves, care for their families, and find a
home.112 This must all be done in a new country with a foreign
language and unfamiliar culture.113
Perhaps most significantly, and the focus of the
remainder of this Comment, the psychological effects of
persecution on refugees have a profound negative impact on
their ability to timely apply for asylum. The magnitude of
this negative influence is directly tied to the severity of the
persecution—the worse the trauma suffered, the more
profound the impact is likely to be. Thus, the one-year bar
has the perverse effect of placing a disproportionately higher
burden on those individuals who have suffered the greatest
injustice.

107. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORM I-589, APPLICATION
ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL: INSTRUCTIONS (2014),
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf.
FOR

108. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 97, at 1, 8-9.
109. Id. at 8-9.
110. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK: UNFAIR U.S. LAWS HURT
ASYLUM SEEKERS 15 (2002), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/refugee_women.pdf [hereinafter HRW, REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK].
111. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 97, at 52-53.
112. HRW, REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK, supra note 110, at 15-16.
113. Schrag et al., supra note 55, at 672. See generally Walter Kalin, Troubled
Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-Hearing, 20
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986).
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At every stage of asylum proceedings, adjudicating
officials have consistently failed to appropriately and fairly
recognize the negative effects of persecution. This failure has
resulted in preventing those who have suffered the most from
obtaining the relief they deserve and is a problem that must
be addressed.
II. MENTAL DISORDERS IN REFUGEE POPULATIONS
Before addressing how claims that a mental condition
excused an untimely application are adjudicated, it is
essential to understand the nature of the mental disorders
that plague many refugees.114 The most common mental
disorders in the refugee population are posttraumatic stress
disorder (“PTSD”) and major depressive disorder (“MDD”).
This Part will discuss each of these disorders and then
explain why they are so prevalent in the refugee community.
A. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder
PTSD has been recognized by mental health clinicians
since the DSM-III was published in 1980.115 Previously
recognized as an anxiety disorder, the newest iteration of the
DSM, DSM-V, categorizes PTSD as a “Trauma and Stressor
Related Disorder.”116 PTSD describes a constellation of
symptoms that may materialize as the result of a very
114. Cf. Brandon R. White, Termination of Parental Rights of the Mentally
Disabled in New York: A Call for Change, 34 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2016)
(examining social science research to support proposed amendment to state
termination of parental rights statute).
115. Chris R. Brewin & Emily A. Holmes, Psychological Theories of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 339, 339 (2003); Stuart
L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum Applicants: Don’t be
Fooled, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 725, 725 (2008). The medical
community has recognized a PTSD-like trauma related mental condition, by
various names, since at least the American Civil War. Charles B. Nemeroff et al.,
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A State-of-the-Science Review, 40 J. PSYCHIATRIC
RES. 1, 2 (2006).
116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1 (2013),
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/PTSD%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [hereinafter PTSD
FACTSHEET]. The DSM-V made only minor alterations to PTSD. Id. For the
purposes of analysis these distinctions are largely inconsequential. Id.
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stressful or traumatic event or series of events.117 To be
diagnosed with PTSD, an individual must be exposed to (or
perceive that he or she was exposed to) death, serious injury,
or sexual violation.118 Additionally, the exposure must result
from one or more of the following: (1) direct exposure to a
traumatic event; (2) the witnessing of a traumatic event in
person; (3) subsequently learning of a traumatic event that
occurred to a close family member or friend; or (4) first-hand
experiences with repeated or extreme exposure to details of a
traumatic event.119
The DSM-V recognizes four distinct clusters of symptoms
resulting from PTSD: re-experiencing, avoidance, negative
changes in cognition and mood, and hyperarousal.120 Reexperiencing symptoms are spontaneous and intrusive
memories of the precipitating traumatic event or events. 121
These memories are usually accompanied by the same
emotional responses (e.g., fear or horror) that accompanied
the original event.122 Re-experiencing symptoms may include
reoccurring nightmares or flashbacks in which the individual
re-experiences the traumatic event.123 Flashbacks are often

117. Id.
118. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL
DISORDERS 271 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V].

OF

MENTAL

119. Id. The DSM-IV previously required that the individual experiencing the
traumatic event respond with feelings of “intense fear, helplessness or horror.”
PTSD FACTSHEET, supra note 116, at 1. It was found that this did not aid in
predicting the onset of PTSD, and the requirement was deleted. Id.
120. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271-72. The DSM-IV’s description of PTSD is
largely the same as the newest iteration, but clustered these symptoms in three
groups: intrusive memories; avoidance and numbing; and increased anxiety or
heightened emotions. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 463-68 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV].
121. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271; see also Matthew J. Friedman et al.,
Considering PTSD for DSM-5, 28 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 750, 750-51 (2011); Jose
A. Saporta, Jr. & Bessel A. van der Kolk, Psychobiological Consequences of Severe
Trauma, in TORTURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT TREATMENT APPROACHES
151, 153 (Metin Basoglu ed., 1992).
122. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271.
123. Id.; Matthew J. Friedman, PTSD and Related Disorders, in POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1, 2 (Dan J. Stein et al. eds., 2011); see also STEVE
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precipitated by a “trigger”—a sensory stimulus that the
individual has associated with the trauma.124 In more severe
cases the individual may be unable to distinguish the
memory from the present.125
Avoidance symptoms describe the actions an individual
suffering from PTSD takes to avoid external reminders of the
trauma.126 Individuals suffering from PTSD often go to great
lengths to avoid situations, places, or people that trigger
memories, distressing thoughts, or feelings about the original
trauma.127 For example, someone who developed PTSD after
a car accident would be likely to avoid driving or riding in
cars. The motivation to avoid thinking about past trauma
often prevents individuals with PTSD from seeking
treatment because it would require them to talk about the
event.128
The symptom cluster of negative changes in cognition
and mood includes a number of changes in the ways PTSD
afflicted individuals view themselves and others.129 This often
includes “persistent (i.e., always or almost always) and
exaggerated negative expectations regarding important
aspects of life applied to oneself, others, or the future
(e.g., . . . ‘People in authority can’t be trusted’).”130 Negative
changes in cognition may also manifest as “persistent
erroneous cognitions about the causes of the traumatic event
that lead them to blame themselves or others[,] . . . [a]
persistent negative mood state[,] . . . markedly diminished
interest
or
participation
in
previously
enjoyed
activities, . . . estrange[ment] from other people[,] . . . a
persistent inability to feel positive emotions,” and “an
EARLE, COPPERHEAD ROAD (Universal City Records 1988) (“And now the D.E.A.’s
got a chopper in the air. I wake up screaming like I’m back over there.”).
124. See Lustig, supra note 115, at 726.
125. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271-72.
126. Id. at 271, 275; Friedman, supra note 123, at 763-64.
127. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 275.
128. Id.
129. Id.; see Friedman, supra note 123, at 10-11; Saporta & van der Kolk, supra
note 121, at 153-54.
130. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 275.
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inability to remember key aspects of the event.”131 Individuals
with PTSD will often exhibit restricted emotional range and
report feeling numb.132 This, in turn, negatively affects their
ability to form and maintain normal relationships.133 These
changes may also lead to the development of a foreshortened
sense of the future, anticipation of a short life, and a difficulty
planning for the future.134
Hyperarousal symptoms represent a variety of
behaviors, including “aggressive[,] . . . reckless or selfdestructive behavior” and “hypervigilance.”135 Individuals
with PTSD are often at a constant state of alert are and
easily startled.136 This increased vigilance often leads to sleep
disturbances and difficulty concentrating.137
B. Depression
All depressive disorders are characterized by a sad,
empty, and/or irritable mood accompanied by somatic and
cognitive changes that negatively influence the ability to
function.138 The classic depressive disorder is MDD.139 MDD
is diagnosed when an individual experiences discrete
episodes of two or more weeks’ duration.140 Generally,
however, these episodes last much longer.141 MDD is
131. Id.
132. Id.; Lustig, supra note 115, at 726.
133. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 275-76.
134. Friedman, supra note 123, at 14; Lustig, supra note 115, at 726.
135. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 272, 276; see also Saporta & van der Kolk, supra
note 121, at 155-56.
136. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 276; Lustig, supra note 115, at 726.
137. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 276; Friedman, supra note 123, at 14-15.
138. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 155.
139. Id. at 160. The category of depressive disorders also includes Persistent
Depressive Disorder (or Dysthymia), Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder,
Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder, Substance/Medication-Induced Depressive
Disorder, Depressive Disorder Due to Another Medical Condition, and
Unspecified Depressive Disorder. Id. at 155.
140. Id. at 163.
141. Id.
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characterized by depressed mood and markedly diminished
interest in or pleasure from activities.142 Other symptoms
include significant weight loss or gain, insomnia or
hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue
or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or guilt,
diminished ability to think or concentrate, and suicidal
ideation.143 For MDD to be diagnosed, these symptoms must
be present nearly every day.144
Individuals suffering from MDD describe their mood as
depressed, sad, hopeless, discouraged, or numb.145 Loss of
interest and pleasure is almost always a symptom of MDD
and individuals lose interest in hobbies or activities they
used to find enjoyable.146 Social withdrawal and distancing
from family and friends is also very common in MDD.147 MDD
can have a profound impact on an individual’s ability to
think, concentrate, and make decisions.148 Because they are
often easily distracted and experience pronounced memory
loss, cognitively demanding pursuits can become impossible
for individuals with MDD.149 At its worst, MDD can cause
individuals to become catatonic or otherwise render them
completely unable to conduct basic self-care.150 Even outside
of these extreme cases, those with MDD experience a higher
rate of physical illness and attendant pain as well as
decreases in physical, social, and role functioning.151

142. Id. at 161.
143. Id. at 163-67.
144. Id. at 163.
145. Id. at 162.
146. Id. at 162-63.
147. Id. at 163.
148. Id. at 164.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 165-66.
151. Id. at 167.
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C. PTSD and MDD are Highly Comorbid
PTSD and MDD are highly comorbid.152 Estimates vary,
but as many as two thirds of trauma survivors with PTSD
also satisfy the diagnostic criteria for MDD.153 Additionally,
95% of those with a diagnosis of PTSD will also develop MDD
at some point in their life.154 In addition to symptoms of
depression appearing more frequently in trauma survivors,
when they do appear, depressive symptoms are more intense
in those suffering from PTSD.155
One reason for the high rate of comorbidity for PTSD and
MDD is that the two disorders share common risk factors. 156
Particularly significant risk factors for the development of

152. Sayamwong E. Hammack et al., Overlapping Neurobiology of Learned
Helplessness and Conditioned Defeat: Implications for PTSD and Mood Disorders,
62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 565, 565 (2012); Shakeh Momartin et al., Comborbidity
of PTSD and Depression: Associations with Trauma Exposure, Symptom Severity
and Functional Impairment in Bosnian Refugees Resettled in Australia, 80 J.
AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 231, 232 (2004); see also Rachel Yehuda et al., Effects of
Trauma Exposure on the Cortisol Response to Dexamethasone Administration in
PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder, 29 PSYCHONEUROENDOCIRNOLOGY 389, 39091 (2004).
153. Yehuda et al., supra note 152, at 390. Comorbidity studies often focus on
particular at-risk groups, and while results vary, they consistently demonstrate
a significant correlation. See Arieh Y. Shalev et al., Prospective Study of
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression Following Trauma, 155 AM. J.
PSYCHIATRY 630, 630 (1998). For instance, co-occurrence of PTSD and MDD has
been found in 30% of survivors of mass shootings, 29% of patients in burn units,
53% of help-seeking survivors of motor vehicle accidents, and 56% of help-seeking
war veterans. Id. at 631.
154. Michael Brune et al., Belief Systems as Coping Factors for Traumatized
Refugees: A Pilot Study, 17 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 451, 452 (2002).
155. Shalev et al., supra note 153, at 630.
156. See Kylie Sutherland & Richard A. Bryant, Autobiographical Memory and
the Self-Memory System in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 22 J. ANXIETY
DISORDERS 555, 555-56 (2008). There is some overlapping of symptoms for PTSD
and MDD and, accordingly, some of this comorbidity may also be the result of
diagnostic factors. See Sutherland & Bryant, supra, at 556 (“Although PTSD is
nominally an anxiety disorder, it is also characterized by depressive
symptomatology.”).
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both PTSD and MDD are stress and unfavorable life
conditions.157
Individuals diagnosed with MDD tend to have
experienced more negative life events, like those resulting
from trauma, than individuals without MDD.158 Exposure to
trauma has been “recognized as a major antecedent of both
PTSD and MDD.”159 Traumatization in childhood or
adolescence also increases both the risk that individuals will
develop depression later in life as well as the likelihood that
PTSD will develop as the result of a later, unrelated
trauma.160
In addition to creating a higher risk of developing PTSD
and/or MDD, these same risk factors can also lead to
aggravated symptoms in both.161 In essence, this can form a
positive feedback loop. The presence of one disorder may
contribute to the development of the other.162 The
presentation of the second, in turn, can then lead to worsened
symptoms in the first.163 When PTSD and depression occur
together this tends to result in a very high level psychosocial
impairment.164
PTSD and MDD also appear to share similar causal
mechanisms.165 It has been proposed, with substantial
support, that a critical component of both MDD and PTSD is
some kind of disruption in the central serotonin system.166 In
157. See Angela Nickerson et al., A Critical Review of Psychological Treatments
of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Refugees, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 399, 41213 (2011).
158. Yoav Kohn et al., Increased Prevalence of Negative Life Events in Subtypes
of Major Depressive Disorder, 42 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 57, 57, 61 (2001).
159. Yehuda et al., supra note 152, at 390.
160. Pallavi Nishith et al., Prior Interpersonal Trauma: The Contribution to
Current PTSD Symptoms in Female Rape Victims, 109 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 20,
20-21, 23-24 (2000).
161. See Brune et al., supra note 154, at 452.
162. See Momartin et al., supra note 152, at 236.
163. See Brune et al., supra note 154, at 451.
164. Momartin et al., supra note 152, at 232, 236.
165. Hammack et al., supra note 152, at 566.
166. Id.
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light of this, it is unsurprising that a common and effective
pharmacological treatment for both disorders is Selective
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”).167 Both MDD and
PTSD are also associated with elevations in corticotropinreleasing factor (“CRF”).168 These common physiological
factors may help explain why individuals with one of these
disorders are more prone to developing the other.169
D. PTSD and MDD in Refugees
Studies conducted on refugee mental health in a broad
array of settings consistently show higher rates of
psychological disorders—particularly mood, anxiety, and
trauma disorders—in refugee populations than in nonrefugee populations.170 This is especially true for PTSD and
MDD.171 Estimates vary between groups, but PTSD likely
occurs at a rate of over thirty percent for refugees as a
whole.172 Compare this rate to that for the general U.S.
167. Id.
168. Yehuda et al., supra note 152, at 399.
169. See, e.g., id.
170. Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 400.
171. Belinda Graham et al., Overgeneral Memory in Asylum Seekers and
Refugees, 45 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 375, 377 (2014)
(“PTSD and depression are highly co-morbid particularly in the refugee
population . . .”) (citations omitted).
172. Studies on PTSD prevalence in refugees and asylum seekers often focus on
those fleeing particular countries in varying circumstances. Rates of PTSD in
these groups vary. By way of example, a 2002 study found that 4% of Vietnamese
refugees resettled in Austraila suffer from PTSD, Zachary Steel et al., Long-Term
Effect of Psychological Trauma on the Mental Health of Vietnamese Refugees
Resettled in Australia: A Population-Based Study, 360 LANCET 1056, 1057-58
(2002), a 1998 study found that 90% of former Vietnamese political detainees
resettled in Boston between 1990–1992 suffered from PTSD, Richard F. Mollica
et al., The Dose-Effect Relationships Between Torture and Psychiatric Symptoms
in Vietnamese Ex-Political Detainees and a Comparison Group, 186 J. NERVOUS
& MENTAL DISEASE 543, 543-44 (1998) [hereinafter Mollica et al., Torture], and a
1999 study found 26.3% of Bosnian refugees living in a specific refugee camp
suffered from PTSD, Richard F. Mollica et al., Disability Associated with
Psychiatric Comorbidity and Health Status in Bosnian Refugees Living in
Croatia, 281 JAMA 433, 434, 436 (1999) [hereinafter Mollica et al., Bosnian
Refugees]. A meta-analysis of 181 studies estimated that the rate of PTSD
occurrence in all refugee groups was 30.6%. Zachary Steel et al., Association of
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population, which only suffers from PTSD at a rate of about
3.5 percent.173 Outside the United States, the rate appears to
be even lower.174 The rate of depression in refugee
populations has been estimated to be as high as nearly forty
percent.175 MDD occurs in the general U.S. population at a
rate of about 6.7%, though this rate varies among different
groups.176
The high rate of PTSD in refugee populations can largely
be explained by two unique aspects of the refugee condition.177
First, the nature of the trauma refugees suffer as a result of
their persecution is especially conducive to the development
of PTSD with particularly severe symptoms.178 Second,
events that often occur subsequent to a refugee’s escape from
persecution increases refugees’ susceptibility to PTSD and
MDD and are likely to aggravate resulting symptoms.179
The most obvious reason for the high rate of PTSD and
MDD in refugees is the persecution at the core of their status
Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic Events with Mental Health Outcomes
Among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict and Displacement: A Systematic
Review and Meta-Analysis, 302 JAMA 537, 537 (2009). But see Mina Fazel et al.,
Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 7000 Refugees Resettled in Western
Countries: A Systematic Review, 365 LANCET 1309, 1310 (2005) (discussing metaanalysis and suggesting that the rate of PTSD among all groups of refugees is
approximately 10%).
173. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month
DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 621 (2005).
174. See id. at 617.
175. Mollica et al., Bosnian Refugees, supra note 172, at 437. Like the estimates
of PTSD prevalence, these estimates vary across different refugee groups and
studies. Michael Hollifield et al., Measuring Trauma and Health Status in
Refugees: A Critical Review, 288 JAMA 611, 611 (2002) (noting variation in
studies, which have found refugees to suffer from PTSD at rates of 4–86% and
depression at rates of 5–31%).
176. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 166. For example, the rate of MDD in
individuals between 18 and 29 years old is three times higher than that for
individuals 60 years or older. Id. Females are also 1.5 to 3 times more likely to
suffer MDD than males. Id.
177. Brune et al., supra note 154, at 451.
178. Id. at 451-52.
179. Id.
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as refugees. While individuals are classified as refugees
solely on the basis of a fear of future persecution, many, if not
most, refugees have actually suffered persecution in the
past.180 Persecution often includes incredibly traumatic and
violent human rights violations and crimes like torture,
murder, mutilation, and rape.181 This type of severe trauma
is closely linked to higher likelihoods of developing both
stress disorders and depression.182 Moreover, persecution
necessitates that the trauma suffered was harm inflicted
through the intentional actions of other humans.183 Intimate,
interpersonal violence is more likely to lead to PTSD than
other kinds of trauma and tends to result in much more
severe symptoms.184 PTSD resulting from interpersonal
violence is also more difficult to treat and recover from.185
Additionally, a refugee’s trauma is often not the result of
a single discrete incident, but rather prolonged and repeated
180. See, e.g., Pistone & Schrag, supra note 97, at 33.
181. See, e.g., Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The men
gave him hallucinogenic drugs, beat him, and hung him upside down over a fire,
causing him to lose consciousness several times.”); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99,
102 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Genital Mutilation is often performed under unsanitary
conditions with highly rudimentary instruments. The procedure is carried out
with special knives, scissors, scalpels, pieces of glass or razor blades in poor light
and septic conditions. . . . Genital mutilation can have devastating, permanent
effects on victims, including immediate and long-term physical problems such as
infection, difficulty during urination and menstruation, incontinence, and sexual
dysfunction; complications during child birth such as fetal and maternal death,
birth defects, and internal damage to the mother; and severe psychological
problems.”) (citations and alterations omitted); Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808,
810 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Kebede testified that she tried to run, but that the soldiers
held her while ripping off her clothes. The soldiers then beat her, and each took
turns raping her while the other held her down.”); In Re D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77,
78 (B.I.A. 1993) (“The applicant stated that the soldiers subsequently came to her
family home where they gang-raped and severely beat her.”).
182. See Murat Paker et al., Psychological Effects of Torture: An Empirical
Study of Tortured and Non-Tortured Non-Political Prisoners, in TORTURE AND ITS
CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT TREATMENT APPROACHES 72, 80 (Metin Basoglu ed.,
1992); Shalev et al., supra note 153, at 631.
183. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012).
184. See DSM-V, supra note 118, at 274-76; Nishith et al., supra note 160
passim; see also Mollica et al., Torture, supra note 172, at 543-44, 550.
185. See Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 412-13.
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actions.186 While a single traumatic event can cause PTSD by
itself, this type of repeated exposure to multiple traumatic
events is much more likely to result in PTSD.187 Add to this
the fact that refugees not only experience trauma directly,
but also indirectly when friends and family are subjected to
the same.188 Witnessing trauma experienced to others can
lead to PTSD and MDD by itself.189 In combination with
trauma suffered personally, this gives rise to an even greater
likelihood of developing these disorders with more severe
attendant symptoms.190
A less obvious, but still very significant, factor in the high
rate of PTSD is the impact of resettlement difficulties.191
186. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing rape,
abuse, and other mistreatment of petitioner for “perceived effeminate behavior
and homosexuality” beginning at the age of three and lasting until petitioner fled
country at the age of twenty); Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 559-60 (7th
Cir. 2008) (describing abuse on account of petitioner and his family’s membership
in a minority religious group lasting from birth until family fled country when
petitioner was fifteen years old); Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2005)
(describing over ten years of continuous threats and intimidation with repeated
and severe beatings).
187. Nishith et al., supra note 160, at 20; Joseph Ssenyonga et al., Posttraumatic
Growth, Resilience, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Among Refugees,
82 PROCEDIA–SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 144, 147 (2013).
188. Flores v. Holder, 699 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2012) (“In 1988, guerillas
went to his father’s house. The guerillas attempted to extort Flores’s father and
also asked about Flores’s whereabouts. When Flores’s father refused to meet the
guerillas’ extortion demands, the guerillas killed him. . . . When Flores’s mother
refused to give information on his whereabouts, the guerillas killed her and raped
Flores’s fifteen-year-old sister. The guerillas later returned and killed Flores’s
stepfather.”); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Zubeda said
that these soldiers tied her father and brother and forced them to watch as they
gang raped her. When they were finished, the soldiers decapitated her father and
brother with machetes and set fire to the family home while Zubeda’s mother and
sister were still inside.”).
189. Louise Silvern et al., Individual Psychotherapy for the Traumatized
Children of Abused Women, in ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY
RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 43, 44 (Einat Peled et al.
eds., 1995).
190. Silvern et al., supra note 189, at 44-45.
191. Sabina Palic & Ask Elklit, Psychosocial Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress
Disorder in Adult Refugees: A Systematic Review of Prospective Treatment
Outcome Studies and a Critique, 131 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 8, 9 (2011).
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Refugees’ problems do not begin and end with the original
persecution, and negative life events are generally associated
with higher rates of depression.192 Fleeing from their home,
and often families, imposes additional stress and leads to a
greater chance of developing PTSD and MDD and can
exasperate the symptoms of already occurring PTSD.193
Subsequent detention in the destination country is among
the worst of these post-migration stressors.194 Separation
from family and friends, fear for those remaining in the
country, and insecure immigration status also have a
significant negative impact on refugee mental health.195
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCEPTIONS BY ADJUDICATING
AGENCIES
With a better understanding of the mental conditions at
issue, we now move on to how claims that PTSD and MDD
are extraordinary circumstances are being adjudicated. As
will be shown, while much of the earlier understanding of the
exceptions mirrored the broad, flexible mandate intended by
Congress, the current understanding of the exceptions has
drastically shifted to an increasingly narrow approach.
The official and explicit guidance that has been given to
adjudicating officials is minimal. There is only one published
BIA decision addressing extraordinary circumstances and
the opinion does little more than restate the language of the
regulations.196 Most federal courts of appeal will also not
review Immigration Court and BIA decisions on exceptions
to the bar. In light of this lack of guidance, USCIS training

192. Kohn et al., supra note 158, at 57.
193. Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 400.
194. Allen Keller et al., Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers, 362 LANCET
1721, 1721-23 (2003).
195. See Palic & Elklit, supra note 191, at 9.
196. In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 287-88 (B.I.A. 2002).
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materials for asylum officers take a position of particular
significance.197
The USCIS emphasizes that asylum officers must utilize
a “flexible and inclusive” approach in evaluating
extraordinary circumstances.198 In regards to the enumerated
exception of “serious illness or mental or physical disability,”
training materials explain that “serious illness or mental or
physical disability include[s] any effects of persecution or
violent harm suffered in the past.”199 USCIS recognizes that
torture or severe trauma “may result in serious illness or
mental or physical disability.”200 Moreover, the USCIS
acknowledges that “[e]ffects of persecution can include
inability to recall details, severe lack of focus, problems with
eating and sleeping, and other posttraumatic stress
disorder . . . symptoms.”201 As such, if applicants suffered
torture or trauma, it is important that asylum officers “elicit
information about any continuing effects from that torture or
trauma.”202
Recognizing the regulation’s enumerated list of
extraordinary circumstances, the training materials on the
one-year bar also include a list of additional examples not
explicitly mentioned in the regulations.203 These include
“severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation within
a refugee community, profound language barriers, or
profound difficulties in cultural acclimatization,” if these
factors “had a severe enough impact on the applicant’s
functioning to have produced a significant barrier to timely
filing.”204

197. Leena Khandwala et al., The One-Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona
Fide Refugees, Contrary to Congressional Intent and Violative of International
Law, 05-08 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2005).
198. FILING DEADLINE TRAINING COURSE, supra note 69, at 21-22.
199. Id. at 13, 14.
200. Id. at 14.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 13, 20.
204. Id.
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Congress’ original intent was for the exceptions to be
broadly applied. The language discussed above appears to
recognize this intention. However, an examination of actual
decisions regarding whether PTSD and MDD qualifies as an
extraordinary circumstance belies an increasingly narrow
and demanding interpretation.205
 A victim of domestic abuse from Guatemala filed for asylum outside the one year deadline.206 She presented evidence of PTSD and argued that her mental condition constituted an extraordinary circumstance excusing her failure to timely file for asylum.207 The immigration judge
held that the applicant’s PTSD did not rise to the level
necessary to excuse her untimely application.208 In support of this conclusion the immigration judge cited evidence showing that, since the applicant’s arrival in the
United States, she had found employment and paid her
bills.209
 Similarly, an asylum applicant fleeing female genital cutting (“FGC”) in Kenya was denied an extraordinary circumstances exception despite her mental health issues.210
Applying to USCIS with an affirmative application, the
applicant submitted a psychologist evaluation to show she
205. The BIA and Immigration Courts publish very few cases and often provide
very little substantive analysis of denials. See NO PROTECTION, supra note 101, at
7-8. Moreover, few federal courts even entertain challenges to decisions regarding
decisions on one-year bar exceptions. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d 762,
765 (11th Cir. 2007). In those few courts, most of the decisions on this issue appear
in unpublished decisions with minimal discussion. See, e.g., Uppal v. Gonzales,
240 F. App’x 243, 244 (9th Cir. 2007). This dearth of precedent is a serious
problem by itself but one that is beyond the limited scope of this Comment. The
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies and Human Rights First have both done
an admirable job of compiling data on asylum cases that do not appear in official
adjudicating materials. See generally HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90;
Musalo & Rice, supra note 51. The following cases are examples culled from this
data.
206. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 700.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. After being denied asylum, the applicant in this case was ultimately
granted withholding and CAT relief. Id.
210. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 31-32.
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was excused from her untimely failure by her mental issues.211 The psychologist diagnosed the applicant with
PTSD and MDD and concluded that her condition significantly interfered with her ability to function.212 Noting
that the applicant’s condition had not prevented her from
attending church during the year immediately after she
arrived in the United States, the asylum officer concluded
that the applicant’s mental conditions did not excuse her
late application.213
Another woman fleeing FGC in Kenya, as well as an extremely abusive husband, was similarly denied an exception despite a diagnosis of PTSD.214 The immigration
judge accepted the applicant’s diagnosis of PTSD.215 However, the immigration judge was impressed by the applicant’s well written pro se application and found that the
applicant had shown “entrepreneurial skills” in raising
money and caring for her children while she was homeless
in the United States.216 Because of this, the immigration
judge did not see how her PTSD could be directly related
to her untimely failure.217
A woman from Gambia was forced to marry a man who,
for decades, raped and physically abused her.218 After attempting to leave him multiple times she was finally able
to escape to the United States. Suffering from PTSD and
MDD, the woman did not learn about asylum until after
she had been in the United States for several years.219 The
applicant submitted a medical evaluation diagnosing her
with PTSD and MDD but her application was rejected by

211. Id.
212. Id. at 32.
213. Id.
214. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 704-05.
215. Id. at 705.
216. Id.
217. Id. The applicant in this case was granted withholding of removal. Id.
218. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 31.
219. Id.
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the asylum office and Immigration Court.220 The immigration judge explained that he did not find her PTSD to
constitute an extraordinary circumstance because the applicant was still “ab[le] to make appropriate life decisions
[and] . . . relocate to take advantage of opportunities.”221
A woman from Turkmenistan fled to the United States after her son was killed for converting to Christianity and
she was tortured.222 Suffering from extreme depression,
panic attacks, and social isolation, she attempted suicide
and was prescribed psychiatric medicine.223 Because of
her mental condition, she only learned of the availability
of asylum after the one-year deadline had passed.224 Her
mental condition was found not to be an extraordinary circumstance and her application was rejected.225
After being kidnapped and held prisoner by sex traffickers, an Albanian teenager escaped and fled to the United
States as an unaccompanied minor.226 Only a month after
the expiration of the application deadline, she applied for
asylum.227 In Immigration Court, a clinical psychologist
testified that the applicant suffered from PTSD and MDD
and that this trauma had prevented her from speaking
about the trauma she had experienced.228 The immigration judge held that the applicant’s mental conditions

220. Id.
221. Id.; see also Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Khan asserted
that he did not know about the one-year deadline and that his poor mental
health—his depression and fear of being returned to Pakistan—compromised his
ability to timely file for asylum. He argued that these were the sort of
‘extraordinary circumstances’ that should excuse the late filing under 8 U.S.C. §
1158(a)(2)(D), but the [immigration judge] disagreed.”).
222. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 31.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 705.
227. Id. But see Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2004)
(noting that immigration judge found applicant’s PTSD to be an extraordinary
circumstance that waived untimely filing).
228. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 705; see also Mlambo v. U.S. Att’y Gen.,
297 Fed. App’x 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The hearing transcript suggests that the
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could not excuse her untimely failure because they could
not have prevented her from seeking out an attorney.229
The above cases illustrate how many adjudicating
officials
consistently
demonstrate
a
fundamental
misunderstanding of the nature of mental disorders,
particularly PTSD.230 The most common manifestation of this
misunderstanding seems to be when claims that PTSD
prevented timely applications are denied on the strength of
evidence that the applicant’s mental condition did not
interfere in other areas of their life.231 Adjudicating officials
see this as evidence that an applicant’s PTSD or MDD is not
directly related to their failure to timely file an application.232
This flawed analysis ignores the fact that avoidance
symptoms are a principle component of PTSD.233 An
individual with PTSD might go about a great many aspects
of their life with little or no difficulty if these activities do not
remind them of their trauma.234 At the same time, this
individual might be completely unable to deal with
circumstances that remind them of their trauma.235 Such an
individual might not be able discuss or deal with their past
[immigration judge] did not believe that depression resulting from the separation
from one’s family would constitute extraordinary circumstances because that is a
factor present in all cases.”).
229. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 705; see also Goromou v. Holder, 721 F.3d
569, 575 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the BIA held that the applicant’s PTSD
and depression did not excuse untimely asylum application because “the mental
problems or isolation [the applicant] faced were not significantly different from
others seeking asylum in the United States”).
230. Maureen E. Cummins, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Asylum:
Procedural Safeguards Are Necessary, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 283,
313-14 (2013); cf. Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 212 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In affirming
the IJ[’s] [adverse credibility determination], the BIA summarily disagreed with
Ilunga’s argument that it was normal for a victim of torture to appear
‘uncomfortable’ given his experiences. The BIA’s disagreement manifests a basic
misunderstanding of the human condition.”).
231. See Cummins, supra note 230, at 313-14.
232. See id. at 313; Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 703-07.
233. See supra Part II.A.
234. See Cummins, supra note 230, at 312-14.
235. See Lustig, supra note 115, at 725-26, 731.
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persecution at all, let alone in the detail that is usually
required to adequately demonstrate persecution.236
IV. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND LEARNED
HELPLESSNESS
This Comment does not propose that these decisions are
the result of asylum officers and judges that are callous or illintentioned. Rather, the problem here stems from a
reasonable, but fundamental, misunderstanding of the
mental disorders at issue. For those who have not been
through it themselves, the effect of trauma on refugees is
abstract and difficult to understand. This problem is not
unique to asylum law. Reaching into another area of law that
has presented very similar issues—excuse and justification
in criminal law—may offer some guidance on how we might
proceed.
A. Battered Woman Syndrome
Originally formulated by Dr. Lenore Walker, Battered
Woman Syndrome (“BWS”) describes a condition which may
occur in individuals who are subjected to sustained physical
and psychological abuse at the hands of an intimate
partner.237 BWS is primarily used in the courts as part of a
defense strategy when a battered woman kills or assaults her
significant other,238 and to explain changed testimony and
rehabilitate a witness’s credibility.239

236. See id.
237. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). See
generally LEONE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).
238. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lazarovich, 574 N.E.2d 340, 343-44 (Mass.
1991).
239. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 99-100 (Ohio 2006) (“‘Because the
victim’s credibility can be attacked during cross-examination of the victim or even
during opening statements, the prosecution need not wait until rebuttal to
present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. Rather, such testimony
may be presented as rehabilitative evidence during the state’s case-in-chief.’”)
(quoting State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 1997).
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Dr. Walker described BWS as the result of a continuous
cycle consisting of three phases.240 Phase one, or “tensionbuilding,” involves minor incidents of physical and
psychological abuse.241 This minor abuse builds over time and
eventually accumulates in phase two—“acute battering
incident.”242 Phase two involves a serious incident of physical
abuse, often with significant injury to the battered partner.243
Finally, phase three, or the “loving contrition phase,”
involves a period of reprieve where the batterer pleads for
forgiveness and promises to change.244 This eventually segues
back into phase one and the cycle begins anew.245
There are many factors that may prevent a battered
woman from leaving an abusive relationship.246 Women are
sometimes economically dependent on their abuser and
unable to get by on their own.247 They may feel obligated to
comply with social norms and embarrassed or ashamed of the
failed relationship.248 Battered women are often kept socially
isolated by their batterers.249 If children are involved, the
battered woman may stay in the relationship out of concern
for those children.250 One of the most significant of these
240. See LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 126-27 (2d ed.
2000).
241. Id. at 126.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 126-27.
244. Id. at 127.
245. Id.
246. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191,
1196 (1993).
247. Id. at 1233-34; Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert
Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L.
REV. 45, 88-89.
248. Michael B. Frisch & Cynthia J. MacKenzie, A Comparison of Formerly and
Chronically Battered Women on Cognitive and Situational Dimensions,
28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 339, 342 (1991).
249. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense,
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 271-72 (2002).
250. Dutton, supra note 246, at 1234.
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obstacles, however, is fear of the abuser.251 Because attempts
by battered women to remedy their situation often lead to
increased abuse, this is a very legitimate fear.252
The crux of BWS is the theory of learned helplessness.253
Under this theory, after going through multiple cycles of the
abuse described above, battered women may “become so
demoralized and degraded by the fact that they cannot
predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of
psychological paralysis and become unable to take any action
at all to improve or alter the situation.”254 The woman
becomes convinced that there is nothing she can do to escape
her situation without resorting to extreme measures.255 In
effect, because of her experiences, a battered woman may
learn to be helpless. BWS is used to explain why a battered
woman would resort to such extreme measures and attack
her abuser.256
Courts have been reluctant to create an independent
defense based on BWS.257 However, most jurisdictions
recognize the relevance of BWS evidence within the
constraints of traditional defenses.258 Expert testimony on
251. Id. at 1232-33; Burke, supra note 249, at 268-69.
252. Burke, supra note 249, at 268-69; Dalton, supra note 246, at 1232-33.
253. See Burke, supra note 247, at 223.
254. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984).
255. See, e.g., Schopp et al., supra note 247, at 52-53.
256. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who
Kill: A Response to Professor Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 557 (2007).
257. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 621 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).
258. See Bonner v. State, 740 So. 2d 439, 442 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); People v.
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1996); People v. Lafferty, 9 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Morquecho, 54 A.3d 609, 615 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Earl
v. United States, 932 A.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. 2007); State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d
172, 175 (Fla. 1993); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981); People v.
Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123,
1127 (Ind. 2001); State v. Frei, 831 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Iowa 2013); State v. Hundley,
693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 454
(Ky. 1999); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Smullen, 844
A.2d 429, 444 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 633 N.E.2d 1039, 1042
(Mass. 1994); People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992);
State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989); May v. State, 460 So. 2d
778, 785 (Miss. 1984); State v. Worrall, 220 S.W.3d 346, 349-50 (Mo. Ct. App.
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BWS is generally admissible when used to establish
credibility,259 explain why a battered woman stayed in an
abusive relationship,260 and demonstrate the existence of a
subjective belief of the need to defend as well as the
reasonableness of such a belief.261
There are significant problems with BWS.262 These
problems, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment.
The subject of BWS is broached only to introduce the theory
of learned helplessness—a theory which has extensive
support outside the context of BWS—and demonstrate that
courts are familiar with, understand, and are receptive to
this theory.263
2007); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 479 (Nev. 2000); State v. B.H., 870 A.2d
273, 281 (N.J. 2005); People v. Wilcox, 788 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (App. Div. 2005);
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819-20 (N.D. 1983); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d
970, 974-75 (Ohio 1990); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 9 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992);
State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985, 990 (Or. 1985); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d
614, 621 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 1281, 1291 (R.I. 2006);
State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986); Richardson v. State, 906 S.W.2d
646, 648 (Tex. App. 1995); State v. Hendrickson, 914 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Wash.
1996); State v. Stewart, 719 S.E.2d 876, 884-85 (W. Va. 2011); State v.
Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Witt v. State, 892 P.2d
132, 138 (Wyo. 1995).
259. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Iowa 1997); People v.
Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 (Sup. Ct. 2000).
260. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 363 (Ct. App. 2000)
(holding that expert testimony on BWS is “appropriate to explain why [a battered
woman] allowed [her abuser] to return to the family residence” or “why such a
victim may return to the perpetrator”); Brown v. State, 750 S.E.2d 453, 459
(Ga. Ct. App. 2013).
261. See, e.g., Bonner v. State, 740 So. 2d 439, 443-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998);
People v. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 471-76 (Ct. App. 2002).
262. Burke, supra note 249, at 223; Julianne Parfett, Beyond Battered Woman
Syndrome Evidence: An Alternative Approach to the Use of Abuse Evidence in
Spousal Homicide Cases, 12 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 55 (2001).
Briefly, however, Walker’s experimental design and methodology has been
attacked as seriously flawed. Burke, supra note 249, at 237-38. Additionally, from
a feminist perspective, there have been criticisms that BWS “exploit[s] and,
thereby, reproduc[es] norms that support the conditions of [women’s]
subjugation.” Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994).
263. In addition to the judiciary, several elements of the executive branch have
demonstrated familiarity with the theory. Notably, learned helplessness was
heavily incorporated in the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” program. See SENATE
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B. Learned Helplessness
The theory of learned helplessness was first formulated
by Martin Seligman.264 Seligman’s original laboratory
experiment provides a straightforward, easy to comprehend
demonstration of learned helplessness, and it is worthwhile
to discuss it briefly. In that experiment, two sets of dogs were
placed in a fenced-in area with an electricity conducting

SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CIA’S DETENTION AND
INTERROGATION PROGRAM 11 (2014) (“On the CIA’s behalf, the contract
psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on ‘learned helplessness,’
and developed the list of enhanced interrogation techniques that was approved
for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees.”) (citation omitted);
see also id. at 19 n.32 (“‘Learned helplessness’ in this context was the theory that
detainees might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or
uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperate and provide information.”). The
techniques utilized by the enhanced interrogation program were originally
developed for use in the Resistance phase of the military’s Survival, Evasion,
Resist, and Escape (“SERE”) training. See Memorandum from Stephen J.
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of
Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, C.I.A., Re:
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention
Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of
High Value al Qaeda Detainees 7-14, 37 (May 30, 2005). These techniques—which
include, among others, dietary manipulation, nudity, stress positions, sleep
deprivation, and waterboarding—were “designed to simulate conditions to which
[U.S. military personnel] might be subject if taken prisoner by enemies that did
not abide by the Geneva Conventions.” STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS.,
110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xiii
(Comm. Print, Nov. 20, 2008). The military recognized that soldiers involved in
SERE training would be at risk for developing learned helplessness as a result of
the training, and the SERE program included safeguards to prevent this
eventuality. See M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE
UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE THEIR
PROMISE TO HEAL 129-31 (2011). The enhanced interrogation program, however—
whose “primary goal . . . [was] to create a state of learned helplessness and
dependence conducive to the collection of intelligence in a predictable, reliable,
and sustainable manner”—actively sought to develop and exploit those effects.
Memorandum from Stephen J. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen.,
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy
Gen. Counsel, C.I.A., Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined
Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees
59 (May 10, 2005).
264. Martin E. P. Seligman & Steven F. Maier, Failure to Escape Traumatic
Shock, 74 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-2 (1967).
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floor.265 One group of dogs was tethered to the floor, while the
other group was left free.266 The experimenters then ran an
electrical current through the floor, shocking the dogs.267 The
unrestrained dogs were able to jump the barrier and
escape.268 The restrained dogs tried to jump out, but were
unable to.269 After only a few iterations, the restrained dogs
stopped trying to escape from the shocks.270 The
experimenters then untethered the restrained dogs.271 Now,
despite being entirely able to jump the fence and escape,
when the experimenters shocked these newly untethered
dogs, they only laid down on the floor and took the shocks.272
Because these dogs’ previous attempts at escape were
ineffectual, they had disassociated any response from the
outcome—they had learned to be helpless.273
As the theory was developed, Seligman and others found
that it applied to human behavior as well.274 Experimentally,
learned helplessness has been demonstrated in humans by,
among other things, exposing subjects to uncontrollable
aversive physical stimuli such as loud noises;275 tasking
subjects with solving unsolvable cognitive tasks;276 and even
having subjects observe others fail at solving cognitive
265. Id. at 2-3, 5.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 3-4.
271. Id. at 2-3, 5.
272. Id. at 3-4, 5-6.
273. Id. at 8-9.
274. See, e.g., Donald S. Hiroto & Martin E. P. Seligman, Generality of Learned
Helplessness in Man, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 311-12 (1975);
Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness, 23 ANN. REV. MED. 407, 408 (1972).
275. See, e.g., Alan Brier et al., Controllable and Uncontrollable Stress in
Humans: Alterations in Mood and Neuroendocrine and Psychophysiological
Function, 1444 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1419, 1419 (1987); D.S. Hiroto, Locus of Control
and Learned Helplessness, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187, 187 (1974).
276. See, e.g., David C. Klein et al., Learned Helplessness, Depression, and
Attribution of Failure, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 508 (1976).
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tasks.277 In the real world, studies have also found high rates
of learned helplessness effects in a number of diverse groups,
including students,278 drug dependent individuals,279 the
unemployed,280 individuals with chronic illnesses,281 and
family members of patients being treated in intensive care
units, among others.282
In humans, exposure to uncontrollable events may often
lead to the development of learned helplessness.283 This
helpless behavior is primarily the result of two deficits: a
difficulty recognizing a causal relationship between actions
and outcomes and a reduction in motivation to respond to
aversive stimuli.284 First, like the dogs described above,
individuals exposed to adverse stimuli or other events they
are unable to control may learn that any response is futile,
fail to recognize controllable situations, and cease their
efforts to change their circumstances.285 Second, motivation
to respond and act is undermined by a perceived lack of
control over one’s surroundings.286 When the situation
277. See Irvin Brown, Jr. & Dillon K. Inouye, Learned Helplessness Through
Modeling: The Role of Perceived Similarity in Competence, 36 J. PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. 900, 905 (1978); Robert F. DeVellis et al., Vicarious Acquisition of
Learned Helplessness, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 894, 898-99 (1978).
278. CHRISTOPHER PETERSON, STEVEN F. MAIER & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN,
LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR THE AGE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 251-53
(1993).
279. Robert C. Sterling et al., Learned Helplessness and Cocaine Dependence:
An Investigation, 15 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 13, 13 (1996).
280. Arthur H. Goldsmith & William Darity, Jr., Social Psychology,
Unemployment Exposure and Equilibrium Unemployment, 13 J. ECON. PSYCHOL.
449 (1992).
281. Sandra McGuinness, Learned Helplessness in the Multiple Sclerosis
Population, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE NURSING 163 (1996).
282. Donald R. Sullivan et al., Learned Helplessness Among Families and
Surrogate Decision-Makers of Patients Admitted to Medical, Surgical, and
Trauma ICUs, 142 CHEST 1140, 1141 (2012).
283. Steven F. Maier & Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory
and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSCYHOL.: GEN. 3, 3-4 (1976).
284. MARIO MIKULINCER, HUMAN LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A COPING
PERSPECTIVE 15-16 (1994); see also Maier & Seligman, supra note 283, at 13.
285. Nickerson et al., supra note 156, at 413.
286. Hammack et al., supra note 151, at 568-69.
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changes and becomes controllable, however, this learned
helpless behavior remains.287
Moreover, the motivation deficiencies brought on by
learned helplessness have, in many circumstances, been
shown to be a somewhat generalized response.288 Individuals
may not simply learn to be helpless in a single, discrete
situation.289 Rather, motivation deficiencies may exist across
a broad array of diverse circumstances unrelated to the
precipitating stimuli.290 The higher the stakes involved—e.g.,
the more aversive or highly desired the outcome—the more
likely generalized learned helplessness is to develop.291
Learned helplessness also appears to be a major factor in
the development of both depression and PTSD, and the
perception of uncontrollability underlies multiple mood
disorders.292 Uncontrollable stress, or at least the perception
of uncontrollable stress, underlies a number of mental
disorders.293 When animals develop learned helplessness they
287. Nickerson et al., supra note 156, at 413.
288. MIKULINCER, supra note 284, at 16-18; Lyn Y. Abramson, Martin E. P.
Seligman & John D. Teasdale, Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and
Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49 (1978).
289. See Christopher R. Pryce et al., Establishing a Learned Helplessness Effect
Paradigm in C57BL/6 Mice: Behavioural Evidence for Emotional, Motivational
and
Cognitive
Effects
of
Aversive
Uncontrollability
per
se,
62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 358, 359 (2012).
290. See, e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, supra note 274, at 325-27.
291. Carsten Diener, Altered Associative Learning and Learned Helplessness in
Major Depression, in PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: NEW FRONTIERS IN AFFECTIVE
DISORDERS 57, 63 (Dieter Schoepf ed., 2013); see also Abramson, Seligman &
Teasdale, supra note 288 at 68-70.
292. Vincent M. LoLordo & J. Bruce Overmier, Trauma, Learned Helplessness,
Its Neuroscience, and Implications for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in
ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING AND CONDITIONING THEORY: HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN
APPLICATIONS 121, 139-42 (Todd R. Schachtman & Steve Reilly eds., 2011); Susan
Mineka & Katherine Oehlberg, The Relevance of Recent Developments in
Classical Conditioning to Understanding the Etiology and Maintenance of Anxiety
Disorders, 127 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 567, 568-70 (2008); Christopher R. Pryce et
al., Helplessness: A Systematic Translational Review of Theory and Evidence for
its Relevance to Understanding and Treating Depression, 132 PHARMACOLOGY &
THERAPEUTICS 242, 246-49 (2011).
293. Finn Somnier et al., Psychosocial Consequences of Torture: Current
Knowledge and Evidence, in TORTURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT
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often develop a host of behaviors which closely mimic the
symptoms of PTSD and depression.294 These behaviors
include avoidance behaviors, changes in sleeping, eating, and
drinking patterns, increased alcohol consumption, and
antisocial behaviors to name a few.295 It is no surprise then
that the feeling of being unable to control traumatic events is
a significant risk factor for both PTSD and MDD.296
V. APPLYING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS TO THE
ONE-YEAR BAR
Even for medical professionals, mental disorders like
PTSD and MDD are complicated and difficult to understand.
The endless editions and modifications of the American
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
are evidence enough of this.297 For adjudicators and parties in
TREATMENT APPROACHES 56, 67 (Metin Basoglu ed., 1992); see also Steven F.
Maier & Linda R. Watkins, Stressor Controllability and Learned Helplessness:
The Roles of the Dorsal Raphe Nucleus, Serotonin, and Corticotropin-Releasing
Factor, 29 NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAV. REV. 829, 837-38 (2005).
294. Maier & Watkins, supra note 293, at 830; Mineka & Oehlberg, supra note
292, at 569. There are also similarities between PTSD and MDD and animal
learned helplessness at the biological level. For example, learned helplessness is
accompanied by an increase in serotonin activity in the dorsal raphe nucleus.
Maier & Watkins, supra note 293, at 833-34. As discussed above, changes in
serotonin activity are linked with both PTSD and MDD. See Hammack et al.,
supra note 151, at 566. Additionally, many classes of drugs traditionally used as
antidepressants in humans have also been shown to attenuate the effects of
learned helplessness in animal studies. See Hymie Anisman & Zul Merali,
Learned Helplessness in Mice, in MOOD AND ANXIETY RELATED PHENOTYPES IN
MICE 177, 180 (Todd D. Gould ed., 2009).
295. See Maier & Watkins, supra note 293, at 830; Joseph Volpicelli et al., The
Role of Uncontrollable Trauma in the Development of PTSD and Alcohol
Addiction, 23 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 256, 258-60 (1999); see also Lustig, supra
note 115, at 725-26.
296. Pryce et al., supra note 292, at 244 (“Learned helplessness . . . has been
proposed to be a major aetiological process in vulnerability to and onset of MDD,
and helplessness has been proposed as a major psychopathological mechanism in
maintenance of MDD.”) (citations omitted); Volpicelli et al., supra note 295, at
257-58.
297. See DSM-V, supra note 118; DSM-IV, supra note 120; AM. PSYCHIATRIC
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994);
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. text rev. 1987); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
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asylum proceedings, this complexity is even more
pronounced. Legal practitioners may be experts in their field
of practice—the law—but they are laymen to the medical
community.
The theory of learned helplessness is very well suited to
describing the effects of trauma on refugees. Indeed, a “lack
of control over one’s circumstances is a key characteristic of
virtually every state of the refugee experience. This may
result in a pervasive sense of helplessness in refugees, and
can be likened to the concept of ‘mental defeat.’”298
Though there are many complexities to the theory of
learned helplessness that this Comment has not deeply
delved into, on its face, the effects are intuitive and the basic
concept is easy to understand. The simplicity and
straightforwardness of learned helplessness (at least on the
surface) is where its true value lies in asylum adjudications.
These qualities make learned helplessness extremely well
suited to explaining the effects of PTSD and MDD to those
not well versed in medicine or psychology. Inserting learned
helplessness into the debate could serve an important role in
asylum law, both in (1) demonstrating to legislators the
inappropriateness of the one-year bar by adding to the wealth
of data showing the bar is a very poor method for separating
fraudulent asylum claims from legitimate ones; and (2)
providing advocates a tool they can use to demonstrate
extraordinary circumstances within the framework of the
existing law.
A. Learned Helplessness Offers More Support that the OneYear Bar Should be Abolished as an Inappropriate
Obstacle to Obtaining Asylum
The one-year bar is based on the presumption that, upon
arriving in the United States, true refugees will run to the
nearest asylum office post-haste and ask their new
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. text rev. 1974); AM.
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(2d ed. 1968); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF
MENTAL DISORDERS (1st ed. 1952).
298. Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 413.
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government for help. This is an absurd expectation. A key
element in the definition of refugee is government
involvement in the persecution.299 This can mean one of two
things. First, the government of the refugee’s home country
or agents of that government were the actual persecutors.300
Alternatively, if private actors were the persecutors, those
private individuals acted with impunity while the
government stood by and watched or was otherwise
ineffectual.301
Either way, someone who has been persecuted has
learned, often over the course of many years, that turning to
the government for help is pointless or even
counterproductive and dangerous. After escaping to a new
country many refugees would certainly remain, at the very
least, skeptical of any government and hesitant to seek its
assistance. Learned helplessness provides empirical support
for this intuitive conclusion.
Persecution, in all of its forms, is obviously an aversive
stimulus. We might consider turning to law enforcement or
other government officials, the most natural response to this
stimulus. However, because the government is the persecutor
(or at the least demonstrably unable to stop the persecutor)
persecuted individuals would quickly learn that such
“normal” responses aimed at alleviating this stimulus were
futile. Their ability to recognize relationships between
actions and outcomes along with their motivation to respond
to aversive stimuli would become limited—especially in the
context of seeking help from the government—and these
effects would be reinforced the longer the refugee stayed in
that situation.
Like the battered women whose behavior BWS
endeavors to explain, refugees then turn to more extreme
measures—fleeing. The learned helplessness effects,
299. See, e.g., Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that
persecution “implies some connection to government action or inaction.”) (quoting
Lopez-Castro v. Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009).
300. See, e.g., Abdel-Masieh v. INS., 73 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding
persecution where government was actual persecutor).
301. See, e.g., Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding
persecution by non-state actor where government was unwilling or unable to
control actor).
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however, would not disappear when their circumstances
changed. Moreover, the motivational and pattern recognition
deficiencies would not be strictly limited to the persecution
stimulus, but would be much more generalized and extend
broadly to other areas of a refugee’s day-to-day life.
In this light, it appears unrealistic to expect anyone who
has survived the trauma of persecution to reflexively accept
and trust his or her new government with open arms, let
alone actively seek out its help. Yet, this is exactly what the
one-year filing deadline expects of legitimate refugees.
Looking at the circumstances of refugees through the lens of
learned helplessness helps demonstrate why the one-year
bar is fundamentally flawed as a measure to prevent
fraudulent asylum applications.
B. In the Meantime, Learned Helplessness Can Offer
Refugees Help in the Present
Learned helplessness also offers practitioners and
advocates a tool they can use now. Because learned
helplessness is not recognized as a discrete mental illness, it
would likely not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance
excusing an untimely failure by itself.302 An applicant
attempting to show extraordinary circumstances would
probably still have to raise PTSD and/or MDD as the grounds
for waiving the bar. However, learned helplessness is a
pattern of behavior that results from, aggravates, and
contributes to the formation of other mental illnesses.
Though many learned helplessness effects are distinct from
the symptoms of depressive and trauma-related disorders,
learned helplessness is closely related to those disorders and
could be raised in the same breath as a PTSD and/or MDD
claim.
The unique aspects of learned helplessness could be
raised to bolster a claim that PTSD and/or MDD excused an
untimely failure to file and also to help establish that PTSD
and/or MDD was directly related to the untimely failure. Like
the mental disorders raised as the extraordinary
circumstances, the presence of learned helplessness would
302. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(5)(i) (2015).
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need to be demonstrated by an expert witness.303 While
certainly not all refugees develop learned helplessness, for
those refugees who failed to apply within a year of arriving
in the United States, especially those with PTSD and/or
MDD, it does not appear that it would be difficult to make a
strong case for the existence of learned helplessness effects.304
Experimentally, the learned helplessness phenomenon is
identified in humans through the presence of three criteria.
First, the individual displays “inappropriate passivity” by
“failing through lack of mental or behavioral action to meet
the demands of a situation in which effective coping is
possible.”305 Second, the learned helplessness effects are
precipitated by “uncontrollable events.”306 Third, the effects
are “mediated by particular cognitions acquired during
exposure to uncontrollable events and inappropriately
generalized to new situations.”307
Applying these criteria to a refugee’s circumstances, an
untimely failure itself demonstrates “inappropriate
passivity.” The United States offers asylum openly during
the first year of a refugee’s arrival in the United States and
a failure to take advantage of this opportunity within that

303. See, e.g., Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers:
Developing an Effective Model of Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 1001, 1022 (2015).
304. See Metin Basoglu et al., Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading
Treatment: Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY
277, 283 (2007). (“Humiliating treatment and attacks on personal integrity,
cultural values, morals, or religious beliefs may induce feelings of helplessness in
the individual through not being able to act on anger and hostility generated by
such aversive treatment.”). Learned helplessness would be especially likely to
develop when the persecution involves physical or psychological torture. See id.
at 283-84; see also Mollica et al., Torture, supra note 172, at 543, 549-50
(explaining that author’s study found “a higher prevalence of psychiatric
symptomatology among the torture survivor group than the less traumatized
comparison group,” which was consistent with other studies of torture survivors).
305. PETERSON, MAIER & SELIGMAN, supra note 278, at 228-29.
306. Id. at 229.
307. Id. This criterion refers generally to a belief that events are actually beyond
control. Id.
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time frame seems on its face to be inappropriate passivity.308
This criteria could also be reinforced by other examples of
similar passivity in a particular refugee’s life. Second, as
discussed above, any refugee who had suffered past
persecution would undoubtedly have also experienced
“uncontrollable events” (“the infliction or threat of death,
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom” by the
government, with its consent, or which the government is
unable to stop).309 Finally, the very failure to apply for asylum
would support an inference that the helplessness effects are
generalized, extending to situations beyond the precipitating
stimuli.310 The underlying cognitions would have to be
determined on a case-by-case basis, but the existence of a
diagnosable disorder in the form of depression or PTSD
would go a long way towards that demonstration.311
Individuals raising PTSD and MDD as an extraordinary
circumstance also often admit to not knowing about the
availability of asylum or not knowing how to go about
obtaining it.312 Generally, lack of knowledge is not an

308. Cf. id. at 257 (“Thus, burnout involves maladaptive passivity. Those
experiencing work-related exhaustion are rigid and do not seek solutions to their
problems.”). Of course, this ignores other reasons for the passivity, including the
avoidance symptoms of PTSD. However, human behavior can hardly be boiled
down to single all-or-nothing causes or motivations, and this Comment does not
propose the use of learned helplessness as a stand-alone ground for extraordinary
circumstances.
309. See supra Part I.B.; cf. Susan J. Kelley, Learned Helplessness in the
Sexually Abused Child, 9 ISSUES COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC NURSING 193 (1986)
(describing sexual abuse of children as an uncontrollable bad event).
310. Cf. DAVID C. GLASS & JEROME E. SINGER, URBAN STRESS: EXPERIMENTS ON
NOISE AND SOCIAL STRESSORS 78, 85-86 (1972) (showing inability to control noise
generalized to interfere with problem solving while identical noise, perceived as
controllable, had no effect).
311. See PETERSON, MAIER & SELIGMAN, supra note 278, at 255 (“It is easier to
argue for helpless cognitions on the part of Asian Americans. Sue (1997) reviews
research showing that when compared with other (mostly white) Americans,
Asian Americans report less autonomy and greater anxiety, nervousness,
loneliness, alienation, and rejection.”).
312. See, e.g., Mlambo v. Att’y Gen., 297 F. App’x 198, 200 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“The [immigration judge] also noted that Mlambo had stated at the asylum office
that he delayed filing his application because he did not know the asylum process.

2016]

LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND PTSD

463

extraordinary circumstance.313 However, an individual
experiencing the effects of learned helplessness could not be
expected to proactively search for legal solutions to his or her
problems. In this manner, learned helplessness could show
that this lack of knowledge, being the result of a mental
illness, is an “effect[ ] of persecution or violent harm suffered
in the past.”314 This could provide additional support for
PTSD or MDD as an extraordinary circumstance and
illustrate how those conditions are directly related to a
failure to timely file.
Invoking learned helplessness as a way of explaining the
effects of PTSD and/or MDD on an asylum applicant and,
more importantly, how these effects are directly related to
the applicant’s failure to timely file for asylum makes a more
compelling case that an applicant’s PTSD and/or MDD
qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance directly related to
untimely asylum applications. Courts in different situations
have already demonstrated that they are familiar and
receptive to the theory of learned helplessness.315 Raising the
concept of learned helplessness in adjudicatory proceedings
could help bridge the gap between the experiences of refugees
and the understanding of that experience by those in the
legal system.

The [immigration judge] stated that such a lack of knowledge did not warrant a
waiver of the filing deadline.”).
313. See, e.g., Bokhari v. Holder, 463 F. App’x 23, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2012).
314. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(5)(i) (2015).
315. See supra Part IV.A.

